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ABSTRACT
This study examines the extent of the investment banks’ (IB) reputation, both high and low, affect
the performance of the initial public offers (IPOs) on the Malaysian Main Board, Second Board
and the MESDAQ market. Conventional and modified methodologies are used to measure the
abnormal returns of the Malaysian samples between 2002 and 2008. The regression results
based on the modified methods demonstrate that the reputation of IBs have significant influence
over the performance of IPOs. However, the positive impact of the high reputation IBs (High
IBs) is restricted to the Second Board over the short and medium terms but the negative
influence of the low reputation IBs (Low IBs) is confined to the MESDAQ companies over the
medium and the long terms. Contrary to many prior empirical studies, the reputation of the IBs
does posses the signaling power to infer the future performance of IPOs.
Keywords: IPO; investment bank; reputation; performance; abnormal returns; certifications
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini mengkaji sejauh mana reputasi bank pelaburan (IB) mempengaruhi prestasi nilai
harga saham terbitan awam (IPO) yang berdaftar di Papan Utama, Papan Kedua dan MESDAQ
Bursa Malaysia. Metodologi konvensional termasuk juga yang diubahsuai digunakan untuk
mengukur pulangan tidak normal bagi sampel IPO Malaysia yang berdaftar dari tahun 2002
dan 2008. Hasil regresi kajian daripada model yang diubahsuai ini menunjukkan bahawa
reputasi IB mempengaruhi prestasi IPO. Namun begitu, IB yang bereputasi tinggi memberi
kesan positif yang signifikan ke atas nilai IPO yang berdaftar di Papan Kedua manakala IB
yang bereputasi rendah memberi kesan negatif ke atas IPO yang berdaftar di MESDAQ bagi
jangka masa sederhana dan panjang. Bertentangan dengan kajian empirikal yang lepas,
reputasi IB mempunyai kuasa penentu untuk menganggarkan prestasi masa hadapan IPO.
Kata kunci: IPO; bank pelaburan; reputasi; prestasi; pulangan tidak normal; pensijilan
INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) proposals is a complex process. Most investors
rely on quantifiable information such as the financial statements certified by the auditors, the
valuers’ reports as well as the business prospects described in the prospectus to make investment
decisions. However, companies may possess off-balance sheet assets such as know-how and
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human capital values which may not be disclosed in the prospectus. Furthermore, the issuers may
wish to cash out while the values are still high. In short, the issuers and the IBs know the actual
value of the companies better than outside investors. Therefore, astute investors need more than
the quantifiable information to stay ahead in their investment endeavors.
In view of the complexities involved in the evaluation of the IPO proposals, this study
proposes to utilize the reputations of the Investment Banks (IBs) as signals to infer the future
performance of firms with the aim of increasing the investor’s chance of picking the winner IPO.
Signals are subtle messages; knowingly or unknowingly sent by the issuers through actions taken
by them during the offer process which are expected to have repercussions on the future values
of the IPOs. Janney and Folta (2003) explained that signals are "snapshots" of firms at a given
time and clarified that the utilization of signals on the study of IPO performance help to reduce
information asymmetry and transactional hazards without divulging firms’ competitive
advantages. Since financial signals are readily available, Ross (1977) suggested that it would be
worthwhile to use them to evaluate IPO proposals.
According to Ritter (1998), the reputation of agents such as the auditors and IBs engaged to
float companies help to reduce the information asymmetry between the issuers and the investors.
Booth and Smith (1986) emphasized that the reputation of the underwriters (IBs) serve to certify
the quality of the IPO firms. This certification function provides clues on the quality of the firms
and can emit signals to the investors on the future performance of the IPOs.  On this basis, the
objective of this study is to test whether the reputation of the IBs is able to act as a signaling
mechanism to infer the future performance of IPOs.
Prior to the year 2001, the MESDAQ was an independent exchange with only five
companies listed on it. Since it was taken over by Bursa Malaysia Berhad (Bursa), the number of
IPO had surged. On the other hand, the Second Board was absorbed by the Main Board in 2009
and in the same year, the MESDAQ market was renamed as the ACE market. Between the years
2002 and 2008, Bursa is the only stock exchange in the country that offers three separate boards
for companies to list. These three boards are the Main Board, the Second Board and the
MESDAQ market; each with differentiated listing requirements. Among notable differences in
the listing requirements among these three boards are that the Main and the Second Board IPOs
are required to exhibit profit records and the minimum paid up capital (PUC) of 60 and 40
million Malaysian Ringgit (RM) respectively. The MESDAQ IPOs however, are not required to
exhibit a profit stream but must be backed up by a promising business plan (Miranda 2004).
This paper makes a small but crucial adjustment in the methodology used to measure the
longer term performance of the IPOs which are based on the offer price instead of the
conventional first day closing price. This modification is expected to better reflect the returns of
the IPO investors and enhance the regression results of the study. In addition, the High and Low
IB are analyzed as separate variables to determine their respective influence on the performance
of IPOs. Furthermore, by analyzing the data on a consolidated basis as well as by the individual
boards, the specific influence of the IBs on the respective boards could be identified. Not many
studies compare the results of the three boards concurrently because the Second Board and the
MESDAQ companies coexisted on Bursa for only 8 short years.
It is important to note that there are differences in the terminology used in this study; papers
before 1990s refer the main agent responsible to float companies as the underwriter, but recent
articles refer the agent as the IB. In this study, the underwriter and the IB refer to the same agent.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The notion of IB reputation having influence on the performance of IPOs, stems from the
endogenous factors that exist within the IBs. Beatty and Ritter (1986) found that IBs have
reputation capital at stake and are expected to balance the interest of investors and issuers to
ensure continuous success. Otherwise, their future market share would suffer. However, from
time to time, IBs do misjudge the aftermarket prices of IPOs. Ritter (2003) further elaborates that
High IB has vested capital and legal risk at stake and thus prefers to take on less risky clients.
This legal risk concern is again highlighted by Aharony, Lin and Loeb (1993) where they
confirm that the highly ranked underwriters (High IBs) and auditors have greater incentive to
provide accurate information on IPO valuations because of the potential law suit and the risk on
their reputation capital. In addition, only the superior firms can afford the high fees charged by
the High IBs.
Firm which inspire to be publicly listed usually consult an IB when the idea of floatation is
first mooted. The roles play by IBs at this appraisal stage is to assess the eligibility of the issuers.
During the listing process, IBs have ample opportunities to evaluate the quality of the firm and
concurrently, the potential issuers are actively assessing the capability of the IBs. This behavior
often leads to a phenomenon whereby the sizeable and superior IPOs are usually managed by the
High IBs and vice versa. This phenomenon is confirmed by Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt
(2004) with their Mutual Choice Model.
Owing to the vested capital and the legal risk consideration, High IBs impose stricter
practice standards compared to the Low IBs when floating companies. Investors view this
practice as a certification function whereby IPOs managed by High IBs are considered superior
in quality. Therefore theoretically, these superior IPOs are expected to yield lower first day
returns due to more accurate valuation but perform better in the long term.
Past studies have so far helped to establish the fact that in theory, the reputation of the IBs
are expected to have influence over the post listing performance of IPOs due to the certification
function. However, the results demonstrated by empirical studies have not been as conclusive.
While some studies found that the reputation of IBs lead to positive values, some studies
identified negative associations, while others find poor correlations.
Carter and Manaster (1990) study on 262 High IB and 239 Low IB IPOs in the US between
1979 and 1983 found that the first day returns of the High and the Low IBs are 13.16% and
19.50% respectively, significant at 5% and with the Pearson correlation of -56.08%. According
to them, the prestigious IBs protect their reputation by only associating with IPOs of low
dispersion in values, thus resulting in the low short term returns. As a consequence, these low
risk IPOs do not attract informed investor as they expect higher first day returns. On the other
hand, Michaely and Shaw (1994) study on 947 US IPOs between 1984 and 1988 found that High
IB leads to lower underpricing but the long term returns are significantly positive. However, in
another US study, Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) concluded from a sample of 2292 IPOs
between 1979 and 1991 that High IB is negatively correlated to both the short and long term
performances of IPOs. In the same study, Carter et al. (1998) also discovered that the long term
performances of IPOs are generally poor and those managed by the non-high ranked IBs perform
even worse. Hence, the reputation of IBs in the US does posses the signaling power to infer the
future performance of IPOs but the relationships are not homogeneous.
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On the other hand, the Australian experience with the IB’s reputation is different. Based on
380 Australian industrial IPOs between 1994 and 2004, Dimovski, Philavanh and Brooks (2011)
found significant positive correlation between the underpricing and the High IBs. In addition,
other positively correlated variables involve market sentiment and the underwriter’s option.
In a Malaysian study using 18 privatization and 77 regular IPOs between 1984 and 1995,
Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) found that firms which engaged the services of the low
ranking underwriters (Low IBs) underperform the market. Conversely, the performance of the
High IB IPOs outperformed the market 18 months after listing. At the end of the second and the
third year, the abnormal returns were 21.2% and 31.1% respectively, both significant at 5%. The
authors concluded that the engagement of High IBs is able to signal to the market the superior
long term performance of IPOs.
On the other hand, there are studies that refute the reliability of the IB’s reputation as a
credible signal. Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan (2005) used 1655 US IPOs between 1986 and
2001 and found that IB’s reputation could not serve as a signaling mechanism. This finding is
supported by Ang and Brau (2003) where they also reached to the same conclusion. Ang and
Brau (2003) used a bigger US sample of 1837 IPOs from 1980 to 1997 to conclude that IBs and
venture capitalists involvements did not have any certification and third party monitoring effect
on the newly listed firms. However, in another US study, Doukas and Gonenc (2003) found that
venture capitalists’ participation did contribute to the long term performance of 456 IPOs listed
between 1989 and 2000 but the influence by IBs was not significant.
In an European study, Reber, Berry and Toms (2005) used 172 UK IPOs between 1992 and
1996 and found that the value enrichment through advisors' reputation (including IB’s) was
illusory. Nevertheless, they discovered factors that have significant contributions to value
enhancement which include the owner’s retention, the amount of proceed raised and the board’s
experience.
Ironically, many Malaysian studies have not found IB’s reputation to have strong impact on
the performance of IPOs. Chong, Ruhani and Zamri (2009) studied 232 Main Board IPOs from
1991 to 2003 and found that the two control variables that are significant are the market
conditions and the offer size. The underwriters’s (IB) reputation was found to be weakly
correlated to firm’s value. In the study by Nur-Adiana and Kamarun (2004) on 70 Main and
Second Board IPOs between 1992 and 1998, it was found that IB’s reputation and the age of the
firms have little effect on the performance of IPOs. In another Malaysian study that utilized 182
IPOs between 1980 and 1995, Jelic, Saadouni and Briston (2001) initially proposed that the high
quality underwriters (High IBs) can serve as a signaling tool, but only found weak relationship
on the first day of listing.
The review of the literature demonstrates that the hypothesis of IB’s reputation is rational
and it is expected to impact the future values of IPOs. However, a high number of empirical
findings especially in Malaysia did not find strong relationships. A close examination reveals
that one possible reason is the inconsistency in measuring of the investors’ returns. Previous
studies measure the first day returns based on the offer price but the longer term returns are
based on the first day closing price. This treatment segregates the investors into two groups; the
first group is the IPO investors who obtain the shares at the offer price and the second group is
the post listing investors who purchase the shares at the first day closing price. For consistency,
this study proposes to use the offer price as the common base to measure both the short and the
long term returns. Since the offer prices are generally lower than the first day closing prices due
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to frequent occurrence of underpricing, this modified method is expected to yield more robust
results and help to align the empirical findings to the theoretical concept.
DATA COLLECTION
This study used secondary data which include the offer prices, daily closing prices, the
entitlement announcements and market indices for the computation of the dependent variables
downloaded from the Bloomberg financial data service provider. On the other hand, the proceeds
raised and the information of the lead IBs engaged by the companies to derive the independent
variables are collected from the prospectuses.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY PERIODS SELECTED
The number of IPOs successfully floated on Bursa and the numbers of usable observations
between the years 2002 and 2008 are illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Composition of IPO sample across three boards from 2002 to 2008.
Main Board Second Board MESDAQ Total
Year IPO Sample IPO Sample IPO Sample IPO Sample %
2008 7 4 8 8 8 8 23 20 87
2007 15 15 8 8 3 3 26 26 100
2006 10 9 8 7 22 22 40 38 95
2005 16 13 17 15 46 45 79 73 92
2004 15 13 26 27 31 26 72 66 92
2003 16 14 22 22 20 18 58 54 93
2002 22 21 22 19 8 6 52 46 88
Total 101 89 111 106 138 127 350 322 92
% 88% 95% 93% 93%
* Source:  Bursa website
* The IPO columns list the population size and the sample columns indicate the number of usable samples collected. The success
rate of sample collection is 88%, 95% & 93% for the Main, Second Board & MESDAQ respectively.
The justifications for the study period selected from the years 2002 to 2008 are two folds.
Firstly, this period is sandwiched between the post Asian financial crisis and the Subprime
debacle. It is considered a high activity period whereby 350 companies were listed. Secondly, the
results of this period allow for direct comparison among the three boards of listing.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study adopts the conventional statistical analysis technique such as the Cross Sectional
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to determine whether there is any significant relationship between
the post listing performance of IPOs and the reputation of IBs engaged to float the companies.
Before establishing the regression model, we first discuss the derivation of the dependent
variables and follows by the independent variables.
THE DERIVATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
To ensure robustness, two proven methods, the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and the
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) are used as the primary methods to measure the IPO’s
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returns up to three years. CAR and BHAR utilize the Market Adjusted Abnormal Return
(MAAR) as the common component to derive the over and under performance of the sample
companies. MAAR is the difference between the closing price movements of the sample firm
and the changes in the corresponding market index. The purpose of deriving MAARs is to
determine whether the sample firm has over or underperformed the market. The method to derive
MAARs is adopted from Nurwati, Campbell & Goodacre (2007) and is illustrated in a three step
procedure below.
The first step is to calculate the raw returns of the individual sample company using the
adjusted daily closing price.
Rit = (Pit − Pit-1) / Pit-1 (1)
In equation 1, Rit is the raw return for firm i at time t. It is derived by taking the net difference
between the adjusted closing price Pit and the adjusted closing price of the same firm on the
previous trading day, Pit-1, divided by the base of Pit-1. The adjusted closing price is the market
closing price after taking into account all the shareholders’ entitlements. Shareholders’
entitlements may include a combination of dividend, bonus issue, right issue, share consolidation
and split. The resultant is the raw return of a sample firm for a single trading day. A positive Rit
indicates that this stock has made a raw gain over the previous day and vice versa but it does not
demonstrate whether it has under or over performed the market.
Step two is to derive the market returns of the firm for the corresponding trading day.
Rmt = (Pmt – Pmt-1) /  Pmt-1 (2)
The return of the market m, at time period t is represented by Rmt. It is derived by dividing the
difference between the closing market index, Pmt and the same of the previous trading day, Pmt-1
by Pmt-1. The resultant is the market gain or loss for one trading day. The market index adopted
in this study is the FBMEMAS. The FBMEMAS is the index that has the broadest coverage
among the indices on Bursa as it is made up by all Main Board companies.
The final step is to derive the MAAR for firm i on trading day t as illustrated in equation 3.
MAARit = Rit - Rmt (3)
After taking these three steps, the MAAR of one firm for one trading day is established and is
abbreviated as MAARit . A positive MAAR means this stock has beaten the market and vice
versa. This process is repeated using daily data for each sample IPO firm up to three years.
However, for the derivation of MAAR on Day 1, often referred to as the Initial Return (IR)
or in this study, the Market Adjusted Initial Return (MAIR), the components of the calculation
are illustrated in Equation 1 require some fine tuning. This adjustment is necessary because on
the first day of trading (D1), the previous day’s closing price Pit-1 is not available. Instead, the
offer price of the IPO is substituted for Pit-1 to derive the MAIR. The MAIR equation is
illustrated in equation 3a.
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MAIR i,D1 = [(Pi,D1 − Offer Price,i) / Offer Price,i] - Rmt (3a)
Once the series of MAARs utilizing daily data up to 3 years are calculated, CAR and BHAR are
applied to derive the abnormal returns for the various windows. The short term windows include
the first day (D1), one month (M1), three month (M3) and six month (M6). The long term
windows are one year (Y1), two year (Y2) and three year (Y3).
The formula of CAR is depicted in equation 4.
Y3
CAR i,t = Σ MAARi, t (4)
t =M1
i = Sample IPO, t = M1, M3, M6, Y1, Y2 & Y3 windows.
The CAR technique accumulates the daily MAARs for each of the sample IPO for each window
periods up to Y3. A positive value means that the sample company has made abnormal gain
above the market and vice versa.
The BHAR methodology utilizes the same data source as the CAR to derive the
performance of IPOs. Instead of arithmetically adding up the gains and losses of the daily
MAARs as in CAR, BHAR assumes that investors hold on to the investment and only cashes out
at the end of a specific window period. At the end of the specific window, BHAR assumes that
investors dispose of the shares and realize the abnormal gains or losses that represent the
performance of the sample firm.
The formulation of BHAR is depicted in equation 5.
BHAR i, t = [ (1+ Ri,t )] - [ (1 + Rm,t) ] (5)
i = sample IPO, t = M1, M3, M6, Y1, Y2 & Y3 windows.
However, because the abnormal returns calculated for D1 is based on the offer price but the
returns beyond D1 adopt the D1 closing price as the base, this inconsistency in the methodology
implies that IPO investors sell out on the first day of listing to realize the gains and losses.
However, some other investors purchase the same shares on D1 with the closing price and hold
them to the end of the respective windows. To overcome this inconsistency which is expected to
have a negative impact on the reliability of the results, this paper adopts a minor but crucial
modification to the methodology of deriving MAARs base consistently on the offer prices as
depicted in equation 3b.
MAAROPi,t = MAARi,t + MAIRi,D1 (3b)
i = sample IPO, t = M1, M3, M6, Y1, Y2 & Y3 windows.
The initial return MAIR i,D1 from equation 3a is added to the daily MAARi,t from equation 3 to
derive at the daily market adjusted abnormal returns measured from the offer prices for windows
Y3
∏
t=M1
Y3
∏
t=M1
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beyond D1 as illustrated by equation 3b. The new series of the abnormal returns measured from
the offer prices are referred to as the Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns from the Offer Price
(MAAROP). After the new series of MAAROP are calculated for all the sample companies,
CAR and BHAR in equation 4 and equation 5 are regenerated for the various windows for
analyses. The new series of the CAR and BHAR which reflect the returns from the offer prices
are referred to as CAROP and BHAROP respectively. In summary, CAR, CAROP, BHAR and
BHAROR for the seven windows form the four sets of dependent variables for analytical
purpose.
THE DERIVATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables are the High and Low IB dummies which are derived by first
compiling the proceeds raised by each lead IB by multiplying the total number of shares offered
to investors by the offer price. The proceeds raised by the lead IBs are then accumulated and
ranked from high to low as proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1991). There are altogether 15
lead agents within the study period engaged to float companies. However some of them are
technically stock broking houses but for the purpose of this study, they are regarded as IBs. The
proceeds rank is subsequently broken into three equal segments each containing five IBs to be
assigned 1 in each of the segment. The respective segments are referred to as the High, Medium
and Low IB dummies as illustrated by Table 2.
TABLE 2. The categorizing of investment bank reputation into high, medium & low dummies
Proceed Raised in RM High IBDummy
Medium IB
Dummy
Low IB
Dummy
1 CIMB IB 5,914,561,875 1 0 0
2 RHB IB 2,793,478,138 1 0 0
3 AmInvestment  IB 2,588,550,085 1 0 0
4 Aseambankers IB 1,423,684,769 1 0 0
5 MIMB IB 1,200,633,509 1 0 0
6 ECM Libra 644,044,080 0 1 0
7 Alliance IB 615,025,861 0 1 0
8 OSK Sec 555,082,325 0 1 0
9 Hwang-DBS 367,169,886 0 1 0
10 Southern IB 253,340,410 0 1 0
11 Avenue Sec 216,742,033 0 0 1
12 Public IB 200,166,583 0 0 1
13 Kenanga 179,926,425 0 0 1
14 Affin IB 128,089,600 0 0 1
15 KL City 10,240,000 0 0 1
Total 17,090,735,579
Source: IPO Prospectus.
The ranking procedure is based on the Megginson & Weiss’s method of aggregating proceeds raised by the IBs between 2002 &
2008.
Only the High and Low IB dummies are used as the independent variables to be regressed
against the performances of the IPOs. The Medium IB dummy is not taken into account because
it is not expected to generate any significant influence.
MODEL CONSTRUCTION
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The first stage of the cross-sectional univariate OLS involve regressing the High and Low IBs
with the four methods of measuring abnormal returns over the seven windows separately. These
simple models are illustrated by equation 6 and equation 7 respectively.
CAR i,t, CAROP i,t, BHAR i,t, BHAROP i,t =   β0 + β1 High IB i (6)
CAR i,t, CAROP i,t, BHAR i,t, BHAROP i,t =   β0 + β1 Low IB i (7)
i = sample IPO, t = D1, M1, M3, M6, Y1, Y2 & Y3 windows.
In addition, a multivariate analysis consisting of both the High and Low IB dummies are
regressed to uncover the relationships. This model is demonstrated in equation 8.
CAR i,t, CAROP i,t, BHAR i,t, BHAROP i,t = β0 + β1 High IB i + β2 Low IB i (8)
i = sample IPO, t = D1,M1, M3, M6, Y1, Y2 & Y3 windows.
FINDINGS
The universal trend of the performance of IPOs have been established by past researchers to have
high initial returns (IRs) on the first day but followed by underperformances over the longer
periods (Carter et al. 1998). The descriptive statistics display in Table 3 demonstrates the
uniform high IRs by the four methods of measuring firms’ performances. These IRs are 28.5%,
18.7%, 22.6% and 40.4% for the Consolidated, Main Board, Second Board and the MESDAQ
respectively. Evidently, IRs are much higher amongst the smaller companies due to the higher
participation by the informed investors. However, when the windows are extended, the
performance of IPOs based on CAR and BHAR begin to diverge. The performance of CAR on
Y3 for the Consolidated market is 3.9% but the corresponding performance based on BHAR is a
contrasting -37.4%. A close examination reveals that this incongruity arises from a feature
inherent within the CAR methodology when deriving the abnormal returns of the low value
firms. The cumulative nature of CAR tends to overstate the returns when share prices decline to
a very low level. Whenever the prices become extremely low, the percentages of the increment
far exceed the retreat because of the denominators used. This inadequacy of CAR gives the false
observations that the returns are high even though prices have only just reverted back to the
preceding levels. Since the samples used in this study are dominated by the low priced
MESDAQ counters, the performances calculated by CAR need to be interpreted with care.
Nevertheless, since the longer term performances derived by BHAR are mostly negative and
conform to the global trend, the BHAR method is expected to produce more reliable results.
TABLE 3. The descriptive statistics of the performances of the Malaysian IPOs
Conso D1 M1 M3 M6 Y1 Y2 Y3
CAR 0.2853 -0.0395 -0.0362 -0.0224 -0.0124 -0.0494 0.0396
CAROP 0.2853 0.2458 0.2491 0.2629 0.2729 0.2359 0.3249
BHAR 0.2852 -0.0336 -0.02167 0.0333 0.0352 -0.1321 -0.3743
BHAROP 0.2852 0.2516 0.2635 0.3185 0.3204 0.1531 -0.0891
Main Board (89 samples)
CAR 0.1869 -0.0350 -0.0223 -0.0418 -0.0399 -0.0565 -0.1311
CAROP 0.1869 0.1519 0.1646 0.1450 0.1470 0.1304 0.0557
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BHAR 0.1869 -0.0319 -0.0161 -0.0295 -0.0328 -0.0748 -0.1836
BHAROP 0.1869 0.1719 0.1729 0.1493 0.1062 0.0236 -0.1294
Second Board (106 samples)
CAR 0.2264 -0.0355 -0.0319 -0.0265 -0.0032 -0.0643 -0.1127
CAROP 0.2264 0.1909 0.1945 0.1999 0.2232 0.1621 0.1136
BHAR 0.2260 -0.0388 -0.0300 0.0129 -0.0090 -0.1414 -0.2691
BHAROP 0.2260 0.1873 0.1961 0.2389 0.2170 0.0846 -0.0431
MESDAQ (127 samples)
CAR 0.4035 -0.0460 -0.0495 -0.0053 -0.0009 -0.0320 0.2864
CAROP 0.4035 0.3575 0.3539 0.3982 0.4026 0.3715 0.6899
BHAR 0.4035 -0.0304 -0.0187 0.0943 0.1197 -0.1644 -0.5958
BHAROP 0.4035 0.3731 0.3848 0.4978 0.5232 0.2391 -0.1923
The abnormal returns by CAR & BHAR adjusted by FBMEMAS based on 322 observations across 3 boards and over the 7
windows between 2002 to 2008. CAROP & BHAROP are the respective modified version which measure returns from the offer
prices.
On the other hand, when the performances are measured by CAROP & BHAROP which are
based on the offer prices, the mean abnormal returns of the longer terms remained positive
except on Y3 by BHAROP. This set of results helps to demonstrate the advantages of measuring
the longer term performance with CAROP and BHAROP because from the IPO investors’
perspective, their costs of investment are the offer prices and not the day one closing prices. As a
consequence, these results help to correct a misconception that the longer terms performances of
IPOs are negative but in reality, the returns have diminished over time but remained mostly
positive over most windows.
The descriptive statistics of the High and Low IB dummies are illustrated in Table 4. The
results show that on average, more issuers engage the services of High IBs as the lead manager.
The results of the consolidated market indicate that High IB and Low IB get 0.624 and 0.139 of
the IPO market share based on the proceeds raised. The Pearson correlation between the High
and Low IB is -0.519. When examined by the individual board, the bigger Main Board IPOs
engage the services of High IB more frequently than the Second Board and the MESDAQ
companies at 0.831, 0.736 and 0.386 respectively. On the contrary, the small scale MESDAQ
IPOs utilizes the services of the Low IBs more regularly at 0.276 compared to the Main and
Second Board’s of 0.045 and 0.057 respectively. Evidently, to a large extent, the Mutual Choice
Model described by Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2004) is supported as the bigger and higher
quality Malaysian IPOs do exhibit the tendency to engage the services of the High IBs and vice
versa. In addition, these statistics fall in line with Ritter’s (2003) observation that High IBs have
vested capital and legal risk at stake and thus prefer to take on less risky clients.
TABLE 4. The descriptive statistics of the High & Low IB Dummies.
Consolidated Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
High IB Repute 0.624224 1 1 0 0.485077
Low IB Repute 0.139752 0 1 0 0.347269
Main Board
High IB Repute 0.831461 1 1 0 0.376465
Low IB Repute 0.044944 0 1 0 0.208355
Second Board
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High IB Repute 0.735849 1 1 0 0.442975
Low IB Repute 0.056604 0 1 0 0.232182
MESDAQ
High IB Repute 0.385827 0 1 0 0.488718
Low IB Repute 0.275591 0 1 0 0.448581
The High & Low IB dummies represent the top & bottom one third of the cumulative IPO proceeds raised by the IBs
between 2002 and 2008. The Medium IB dummy is not reported.
The univariate regression results of the High IB presented in Table 5 indicate that with the
engagement of High IB, the overall performances of IPOs as illustrated by the consolidated
segment are generally negative in the short terms but improve into the longer terms. These
results are consistent with the findings of Michaely and Shaw (1994). However, the Second
Board IPOs managed by High IBs defy this trend to generate a high IR of 16.6%, significant at
10% and continue to grow into the medium terms. Utilizing BHAROP, the highest coefficient is
positive 37.8% significant at 5% recorded in Y2. Overall, five out of the seven windows display
positive coefficients significant at 5% and 10%. The results indicate that the Second Board IPOs
managed by High IBs outperformed the market by a significant margin. The Second Board
issuers appear to have successfully utilized the certification power of the High IBs to convey to
the potential investors about the superior qualities of their firms.
TABLE 5. The univariate regression results of the High IB for All Markets
OLS : CAR  =  β0 + β1 IB High OLS : CAROP  =  β0 + β1 IB High
Conso Main Second MESDAQ Conso Main Second MESDAQ
D1 -0.069 -0.084 *0.164 -0.049 -0.069 -0.084 *0.164 -0.049
M1 **0.059 0.034 *0.057 0.084 -0.01 -0.05 **0.221 0.035
M3 **0.091 0.016 **0.104 *0.126 0.021 -0.068 **0.268 0.077
M6 0.052 0.033 0.053 0.112 -0.017 -0.051 *0.218 0.062
Y1 0.047 0.119 -0.059 0.133 -0.023 0.036 0.105 0.084
Y2 0.053 *0.271 -0.086 0.106 -0.016 0.187 0.079 0.057
Y3 -0.15 *0.291 -0.111 -0.008 *-0.219 0.207 0.053 -0.058
OLS : BHAR  =  β0 + β1 IB High OLS : BHAROP  =  β0 + β1 IB High
Conso Main Second MESDAQ Conso Main Second MESDAQ
D1 -0.069 -0.084 *0.166 -0.049 -0.069 -0.084 *0.166 -0.049
M1 *0.049 0.043 0.048 0.075 -0.020 -0.041 **0.214 0.026
M3 **0.095 0.039 *0.095 *0.160 0.026 -0.044 **0.261 0.111
M6 0.050 0.061 0.139 0.112 -0.019 -0.023 *0.305 0.063
Y1 0.042 0.122 0.006 0.196 -0.026 0.038 0.172 0.147
Y2 0.132 0.166 0.213 0.054 0.063 0.083 *0.378 0.005
Y3 ***0.295 0.273 0.255 0.072 *0.226 0.189 0.421 0.023
The OLS results of the High IB Dummy as the independent variable against the performance of IPOs between 2002 and 2008.
The dependent variables are CAR & BHAR which measure returns from D1 closing prices & their respective modified versions,
CAROP & BHAROP based on the offer prices are presented for windows from D1 to Y3. The Consolidated market consists of
322 samples made up by the Main Board (89), Second Board (106) & the MESDAQ (127). The probability significance of 10, 5,
& 1% are denoted by *, ** & *** respectively.
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On the other hand, the results of the univariate regression of the Low IB against the IPOs
performance indicate that the overall market reacts negatively to the appointment of the Low IB
as most of the coefficients are negative (refer to Table 6). The strong set of negative correlations
tends to congregate in the MESDAQ market over most windows when the returns are based on
the offer prices. Measured by BHAROP, there are five significant negative coefficients out of the
seven windows. The worst performance is recorded in Y1 where the Low IB managed MESDAQ
IPOs underperform the market by 54.5%, significant at 5%. This result implies that on average, a
RM 1.00 invested drops to RM 0.455 after one year, severely underperform the market by any
standard.
In addition, the performances of the Low IB IPOs of the Second Board have become mostly
negative which are in direct contrast to the High IB Second Board IPOs illustrated in Table 5.
This observation is consistent to the findings of Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) whereby
they found that Low IB managed IPOs perform poorly.
TABLE 6. The univariate results of the Low IB for all markets
OLS : CAR  =  β0 + β1 IB Low OLS : CAROP  =  β0 + β1 IB Low
Conso Main Second MESDAQ Conso Main Second MESDAQ
D1 -0.056 -0.062 -0.24 -0.157 -0.056 -0.062 -0.24 -0.157
M1 *-0.069 -0.046 -0.024 -0.085 -0.125 -0.108 -0.264 *-0.242
M3 **-0.114 -0.01 -0.087 *-0.138 *-0.170 -0.071 -0.327 **-0.295
M6 -0.106 0.051 -0.145 -0.157 *-0.163 -0.01 *-0.385 **-0.314
Y1 -0.116 -0.016 0.017 -0.192 -0.172 -0.078 -0.223 **-0.349
Y2 -0.015 0.011 0.147 -0.077 -0.072 -0.051 -0.093 -0.234
Y3 **0.315 0.089 0.306 0.122 0.259 0.027 0.065 -0.035
OLS : BHAR  =  β0 + β1 IB Low OLS : BHAROP  =  β0 + β1 IB Low
Conso Main Second MESDAQ Conso Main Second MESDAQ
D1 -0.056 -0.062 -0.240 -0.157 -0.056 -0.062 -0.240 -0.157
M1 *-0.063 -0.050 -0.020 -0.088 -0.120 -0.111 -0.260 *-0.245
M3 **-0.125 -0.019 -0.083 *-0.172 **-0.181 -0.081 -0.323 **-0.329
M6 -0.114 0.023 -0.227 -0.197 -0.171 -0.039 -0.466 *-0.354
Y1 *-0.244 -0.089 -0.298 -0.389 *-0.301 -0.151 *-0.538 **-0.545
Y2 -0.223 0.210 -0.377 -0.250 -0.279 0.148 *-0.616 -0.407
Y3 **-0.355 0.038 -0.345 -0.220 **-0.411 -0.024 -0.585 **-0.377
The OLS results of the IB Low Dummy as the independent variable against the performance of IPOs between 2002 and 2008.
The dependent variables are CAR & BHAR which measure returns from D1 closing prices & their respective modified versions,
CAROP & BHAROP based on the offer prices are presented for windows from D1 to Y3. The Consolidated market consists of
322 samples made up by the Main Board (89), Second Board (106) & the MESDAQ (127). The probability significance of 10, 5,
& 1% are denoted by *, ** & *** respectively.
Lastly, the pair-wise OLS indicates that the performance of IPOs handled by the High IBs
clearly outperform their Low IBs counterpart, refer to Table 7. The regression results
demonstrate the general patterns that IPOs managed by High IBs outperform Low IBs across
most boards and most windows. This pattern is evidenced by some of the significant positive
coefficients found in the Main and the Second Board High IB IPOs. On the other hand, a strong
set of negative correlation is found in the Low IB IPOs in the MESDAQ market measured by
BHAROP. As a consequence, the aggregated results of the Low IB of the consolidated market
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have been negatively impacted. This set of results confirms that High IB IPOs outperform the
Low IB counterpart.
TABLE 7. The Pair-Wise regression results of the High & Low IBs.
OLS : CAR  =  β0 + β1 High IB + β2 Low IB
Conso Main Second MESDAQ
High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB
D1 *-0.124 *-0.146 -0.130 -0.175 0.136 -0.135 -0.157 *-0.241
M1 0.046 -0.035 0.028 -0.022 *0.062 0.024 0.06 -0.053
M3 0.066 -0.066 0.017 0.005 *0.102 -0.007 0.085 -0.093
M6 0.017 -0.094 0.060 0.104 0.027 -0.124 0.054 -0.129
Y1 0.005 -0.113 0.150 0.114 -0.067 -0.034 0.061 -0.16
Y2 0.065 0.032 **0.356 0.321 -0.065 0.097 0.094 -0.027
Y3 -0.045 0.282 **0.410 0.446 -0.055 0.263 0.061 0.154
OLS : CAROP  =  β0 + β1 IB High + β2 IB Low
Conso Main Second MESDAQ
IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low
D1 *-0.124 *-0.146 -0.13 -0.175 0.136 -0.135 -0.157 *-0.241
M1 -0.078 *-0.181 -0.102 -0.197 *0.198 -0.11 -0.097 **-0.294
M3 -0.057 **-0.212 -0.114 -0.17 **0.238 -0.142 -0.072 **-0.333
M6 -0.106 **-0.240 -0.07 -0.071 0.162 -0.259 -0.103 **-0.369
Y1 -0.119 **-0.259 0.019 -0.061 0.069 -0.169 -0.096 **-0.400
Y2 -0.059 -0.114 0.226 0.146 0.071 -0.038 -0.063 -0.267
Y3 -0.169 0.136 0.28 0.271 0.08 0.128 -0.096 -0.086
OLS : BHAR  =  β0 + β1 IB High + β2 IB Low
Conso Main Second MESDAQ
IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low
D1 *-0.123 *-0.146 -0.130 -0.175 0.137 -0.133 -0.049 -0.136
M1 0.034 -0.038 0.038 -0.016 0.053 0.021 0.075 0.023
M3 0.067 -0.077 0.045 0.020 0.093 -0.011 *0.160 0.079
M6 0.010 -0.107 0.087 0.099 0.109 -0.141 0.112 -0.038
Y1 -0.066 *-0.292 0.128 0.022 -0.069 -0.352 0.196 -0.051
Y2 0.068 -0.173 0.290 0.462 0.159 -0.253 0.054 -0.204
Y3 *0.224 -0.193 0.368 0.358 0.218 -0.175 0.072 -0.117
OLS : BHAROP  = β0 + β1 IB High + β2 IB Low
Conso Main Second MESDAQ
IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low IB High IB Low
D1 *-0.123 *-0.146 -0.130 -0.175 0.137 -0.133 -0.157 *-0.241
M1 -0.089 *-0.184 -0.092 -0.192 *0.190 -0.112 -0.110 **-0.303
M3 -0.056 **-0.222 -0.086 -0.156 **0.230 -0.144 -0.048 **-0.355
M6 -0.113 -0.253 -0.043 -0.077 0.246 -0.274 -0.126 *-0.421
Y1 -0.189 **-0.438 -0.003 -0.154 0.068 -0.485 -0.129 *-0.614
Y2 -0.055 -0.319 0.159 0.286 0.296 -0.386 -0.234 -0.531
Y3 0.101 *-0.338 0.238 0.183 0.355 -0.308 -0.192 **-0.479
The OLS results of the pair-wise analysis for the independent variables IB High & IB Low dummies against the performance of
IPOs between 2002 and 2008. The dependent variables are the four methods of performance measurements, CAR & BHAR
which measure returns from D1 closing prices and CAROP & BHAROP which are based on the offer prices are presented for
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windows from D1 to Y3. The Consolidated market consists of 322 samples made up by the Main Board (89), the Second Board
(106) & MESDAQ (127). The probability significance of 10, 5, & 1% are denoted by *, ** & *** respectively.
The three sets of regression results demonstrate that High IB managed Second Board IPOs
outperform the market while the Low IB managed MESDAQ IPOs underperform the market. In
addition, the results of this study demonstrate that the regression results are enhanced when the
performances are measured from the offer price, analysis carried out in accordance to the
respective board of listing and the reputation of IBs are separated into the High and Low
dummies.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to most Malaysian studies which did not find strong relationship between the reputation
of IBs and the performances of IPOs, the results of this study managed to align the theoretical
expectation with the empirical findings and reinforce the tenet that the reputations of the IBs are
able to signal to the investors on the post listing performance of the IPOs. With these credible
signals, investors could maximize their returns by investing more in the High IB managed
Second Board IPOs and at the same time avoid the Low IB managed MESDAQ IPOs. However,
whether the characteristics inherent in these firms had continued to manifest and generate the
similar influences especially after the Second Board has been absorbed into the Main Board,
only more research utilizing post 2009 data could unveil.
The two modified methods of measuring the abnormal returns, the CAROP and BHAROP
which are based on the offer prices are, not only helped to enhance the regression results but
have also helped to correct a misconception that the long term performances of stocks are poor.
In view of this, these two methods may bring new lights to the other areas of the stock market
research that was previously found to be low correlated.
However, the findings derived in this study do have its limitations. Although the regression
outputs demonstrated that the reputation of the IBs has influence over the performance of IPOs,
these findings are not meant to replace but to supplement the conventional method of evaluating
IPOs. Furthermore, due to the dissimilar rules imposed by the regulators of the different
exchanges and the fact that the stock market itself is a dynamic field, the results obtained in one
study is generally applicable to the same market over the similar time horizon. In other words,
the conclusions derived in this study are not recommended to infer the outcome in a different
environment. However, any additional research into this field will definitely make some
contribution and solve another piece of puzzle in the comprehension of stock market investment.
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